A well-known problem from the theory of preference aggregation is that sequential pairwise majority voting can yield Pareto-dominated alternatives, provided that there are at least four alternatives (Moulin, 1988, p.242) . Within the general framework of judgement aggregation this is an instance of the fact that sequential majority voting over interconnected propositions can lead to the situation that a previous majority decision forces the rejection of a proposition that is unanimously accepted (see Section 1.5 below for examples).
In this paper, we characterize the aggregation spaces on which sequential majority voting always respects unanimous consent, no matter in which sequence the majority decisions are taken and no matter what the individual judgements are. We shall call such spaces robustly unanimity consistent. It turns out that the robustly unanimity consistent spaces represent a simple and natural generalization of the median spaces which play a distinguished role in the theory of aggregation (see Barthélémy and Monjardet (1981) , Nehring 1 and Puppe (2002, 2007) ). Median spaces are characterized by the condition that the underlying feasibility restrictions among propositions can be described in terms of 'simple' implications each having exactly one proposition as its antecedent. By contrast, the robustly unanimity consistent spaces are characterized by the condition that the underlying feasibility restrictions among propositions are confined to implications in which the antecedent consists of the conjunction of at most two propositions. Evidently, this is still a rather special case; the result thus shows that potential unanimity violations are quite common in judgement aggregation.
While in most spaces violations of unanimity can occur for some sequence of majority decisions (given some profile of individual judgements), a weaker requirement is that they do not occur for all sequences. The underlying idea is that one can perhaps prevent unanimity violations to occur by an appropriate design of the decision path, i.e. by a suitable restriction on the set of admissible (sequential) agendas. Accordingly, we shall say that an aggregation space is designably unanimity consistent if there exists a sequence such that unanimous decisions are always respected provided that the majority decisions are taken in the prespecified order. It turns out that many spaces are not even designably unanimity consistent. However, there are interesting classes of aggregation problems that do have this property. Here, we prove that the spaces of all strict orderings, all weak orderings, and all equivalence relations on any finite set of alternatives are designably consistent, respectively. Our analysis generalizes classic results of Shepsle and Weingast (1984) ; in particular, we define an appropriate generalization of the 'covering relation' corresponding to a majority tournament, and show that it always respects unanimous decisions. We then construct a decision sequence such that the resulting transitive binary relation extends the covering relation, which yields the desired conclusion. While a full characterization of the class of all aggregation problems that are designably unanimity consistent appears to be difficult, we are able to derive a relatively simple necessary condition, which requires that certain 'exposed' feasibility restrictions have limited reach.
The agenda setting problem is a classic topic in political science, see e.g. Miller (1995) . For previous considerations of sequential majority voting in judgement aggregation, see List (2004) and Dietrich and List (2007) . The present paper complements the analysis of Nehring et al. (2013) where we analyze sequential majority voting in terms of the entailed extent of indeterminacy, following the classical approach of McKelvey (1979) . Here, we concentrate on assessing the qualitative 'severity' of the path-dependence of sequential majority voting, as embodied by the violation of unanimous judgements. The widespread tension between unanimity on the one hand and 'premise-based' majoritarian and supermajoritarian voting rules on the other has been studied in the special case of truth-functional judgement aggregation problems in Nehring (2005) . This paper is organized as follows. In Section 1, we introduce the judgement aggregation model along with our terminology and notation. We also present some basic examples of aggregation spaces corresponding to preference aggregation, the aggregation of equivalence relations, the aggregation of general binary relations, committee selection and resource allocation, respectively. In Section 2, we characterize when sequential majority voting can override a unanimous consensus of voters on some issues for some sequence of the voting process, i.e. the class of robustly unanimity consistent spaces. In Section 3, we consider the weaker condition that unanimous consensus be respected for some appropriate sequence of the voting process, i.e. designable unanimity consistency, and give positive as well as negative examples. For ease of reading, some technically more involved proofs are relegated to an appendix at the end of the paper.
, ∀k ∈ [1...K]} be the set of anonymous profiles where there is a strict majority supporting either 0 or 1 in each coordinate. For expository convenience, we will confine our analysis to profiles in ∆ * (X). 2 For every profile µ, we denote by Maj(µ) ∈ {0, 1} K the issuewise majority view, i.e. for any
, and Maj k (µ) := 0 if µ k (1) < 1 2 .
The Condorcet set
In general, one has Maj(µ) ∈ X -the 'majority ideal' can be inconsistent with the underlying logical constraints faced by society.
3 However, a basic principle of majoritarianism is that we should try to satisfy the majority's will in as many issues as possible. In Nehring et al. (2013) , we have thus proposed the notion of the Condorcet set Cond (X, µ) ⊆ X as the set of all views x ∈ X such that no y ∈ X agrees with Maj(µ) on a strictly larger set of issues than x. The elements of Cond (X, µ) are also referred to as the Condorcet admissible views. A profile µ is called majority determinate if Cond (X, µ) is single-valued; in this case, Cond (X, µ) = {Maj(µ)} (see Nehring et al. (2013) ). A space X is called majority determinate if all profiles µ ∈ ∆ * (X) are majority determinate.
Sequential majority voting
For any y = (y k ) K k=1 ∈ {0, 1} K and J ⊂ [1...K], define y J := (y j ) j∈J ∈ {0, 1} J . Furthermore, for any i ∈ [1...K] \ J, say that y i is X-consistent with y J if there exists some x ∈ X with x J = y J and
We now define the γ-sequential majority rule F γ : ∆ * (X) −→X. Let µ ∈ ∆ * (X) and let z := Maj(µ). Define y := F γ (µ) ∈ X inductively as follows:
• Define y γ(1) := z γ(1) .
• Inductively, let J := {γ(1), γ(2), . . . , γ(n)}, and suppose we have already decided y J .
Let i := γ(n + 1). If z i is X-consistent with y J , then set y i := z i . Otherwise, set y i = ¬z i .
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The following result, proven in Nehring et al. (2013) , establishes a close connection between sequential majority voting and the Condorcet set:
Proposition 1.1 (Nehring, Pivato and Puppe, 2012 ) Let X ⊆ {0, 1} K .
(a) For any path γ through [1...K], the rule F γ is Condorcet admissible.
(b) Conversely, for any µ ∈ ∆ * (X) and x ∈ Cond (X, µ), there exists a path γ such that F γ (µ) = x.
Majority determinacy and path-independence
A profile µ ∈ ∆ * (X) is path-independent if F γ (µ) = F ξ (µ) for any two paths γ and ξ through [1...K]. The space X itself is called path-independent if every µ ∈ ∆ * (X) is pathindependent.
Let J ⊆ [1...K] and consider w ∈ {0, 1} J which corresponds to a subset of judgements on the issues in J. The set J is the support of w, denoted supp (w). We define |w| := |J|. If I ⊆ J and v ∈ {0, 1} I , then we say v is a fragment of w (and write v w) if v = w I . Furthermore, w is a forbidden fragment for X if, for all x ∈ X, we have x J = w where J = supp (w). Finally, w is a critical fragment if it is a minimal forbidden fragment -that is, w is forbidden, and there exists no proper subfragment v`w such that v is forbidden.
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Let C(X) be the set of critical fragments for X, and let κ(X) := max {|c| ; c ∈ C(X)}.
A particular role is played by spaces X ⊆ {0, 1} K for which κ(X) = 2; these are known as median spaces in combinatorial mathematics. Their importance in the theory of aggregation has been emphasized by (Barthélémy and Monjardet, 1981; Puppe, 2007, 2010) . Note that a set of feasible views X is a median space if and only if all logical interrelations are confined to simple implications: for some j, k and all x ∈ X, x j = 0 implies that x k = 0, or x j = 0 implies that x k = 1. We have the following fundamental result (cf. (Nehring et al., 2013, Prop. 1.4) , (Nehring and Puppe, 2007, Fact 3.4) ). Proposition 1.2 (Nehring and Puppe, 2007; Nehring, Pivato and Puppe, 2012) Let X ⊆ {0, 1}
K . The following are equivalent:
[i] X is path-independent;
[ii] X is majority determinate; [iii] X is a median space, i.e. κ(X) = 2. 
K represents the space of all tournaments (i.e. complete, antisymmetric binary relations, or equivalently, complete directed graphs) on A. Let X pr N ⊂ {0, 1}
K be the set of all tournaments representing total orderings (i.e. permutations) of A (sometimes called the permutahedron). Classical Arrovian aggregation of strict preference orderings is simply judgement aggregation on X pr N . For any profile µ ∈ ∆ * (X pr N ), Maj(µ) is the majority tournament corresponding to µ. We will write a µ b if the majority strictly prefers a to b, i.e. if Maj(µ) entails a 'yes' on issue (a, b) . By definition, the Condorcet set Cond (X pr N , µ) is the set of preference orderings on A such that no other ordering agrees with Maj(µ) (resp. . Also in this case, one typically finds that the issue-wise majority view does not respect the underlying feasibility constraints, i.e. typically Maj(µ) ∈ X eq N . Consider, for instance, on the set A = {a, b, c, d} the three equivalence relations corresponding to the partitions {{a, b, c}, {d}}, {{a}, {b, c, d}}, and {{a, b}, {c, d}}, respectively. If each of these three equivalence relations receives the support of 1/3 of the population, the corresponding issue-wise majority relation is evidently not transitive; e.g. either pair (a, b) and (b, c) is considered equivalent by a majority, while a and c are considered not equivalent by a majority.
Committee selection
For any x ∈ {0, 1} K , let x := #{k ∈ [1...K] ; x k = 1}. Let 0 ≤ I ≤ J ≤ K, and define
Heuristically, [1...K] is a set of K 'candidates,' and X com I,J;K is the set of all 'committees' comprised of at least I and at most J of these candidates. In the context of the committee selection problem, the Condorcet set can be described as follows (see Nehring et al. (2013) 
} denote the set of all candidates receiving majority support. If I ≤ |M | ≤ J, then the Condorcet set corresponding to µ consists of the single committee containing exactly the candidates in M ; if |M | < I, then the Condorcet set consists of all committees of size I that contain all members of M ; and if |M | > J, then the Condorcet set consists of all committees that contain exactly J members of M .
Resource allocation
Fix M, D ∈ N, and consider the
D can be represented by a point Φ(x) := x ∈ {0, 1} D×M defined as follows:
This defines an injection Φ : [0...M ] D −→{0, 1} D×M , and any subset of P ⊂ [0...M ] D can thereby be represented as a subset X := Φ(P ) ⊂ {0, 1} D×M . Judgement aggregation over X thus represents social choice over a D-dimensional 'policy space', where each voter's position represents her ideal point in P , the set of feasible policies. This framework is especially useful for resource allocation problems, as we now illustrate. Let 6 Note that a number of common restrictions such as symmetry, asymmetry, or completeness, give rise to a median space structure, since they can all be described in terms of logical implications relating exactly two issues. In other words, each instance of one of these restrictions corresponds to critical fragment of length 2. For instance, symmetry corresponds to the implications x (a,b) = 1 ⇒ x (b,a) = 1 for all a, b ∈ A, i.e. to the critical fragments of the form (1 (a,b) , 0 (b,a) ). Similarly, asymmetry corresponds to the critical fragments of the form (1 (a,b) , 1 (b,a) ) for all a, b ∈ A, and completeness to the critical fragments of the form (0 (a,b) 
The space X pr N defined in Section 1.5.1 above can thus be identified with the set of all transitive binary relations that satisfy the completeness and asymmetry conditions for all pairs a, b ∈ A; similarly, the space X eq N corresponds to the set of all transitive binary relations that satisfy all symmetry conditions. Let X N denote the set of all partial orderings on [1...N ], i.e. the set of all transitive binary relations that satisfy the asymmetry conditions for all a, b ∈ A (but not necessarily completeness).
For notational convenience, we will henceforth denote the statement x (a,b) = 1 ('a stands in relation to b') also by aRb, and the statement x (a,b) = 0 ('a does not stand in relation 
Robust unanimity consistency
Sequential majority voting, or equivalently: choosing from the Condorcet set in an unrestricted manner, can lead to violations of unanimous consent in some issues. A simple (and well-known) example is the following situation in the 4-permutahedron, cf. (Moulin, 1988, p.242 ).
Example 2.1 As in Section 1.5.1 above, suppose that µ( 1 ) = µ( 2 ) = µ( 3 ) = The following analysis will show that the unanimity violation displayed in Example 2.1 is due to the existence of a critical fragment of length ≥ 4. This explains, among other things, the well-known fact that unanimity violations cannot occur in the context of preference aggregation if there are only three alternatives.
For any µ ∈ ∆ * (X) and k ∈ [1...K], we say that µ is unanimous in coordinate k if µ k (0) = 1 or µ k (1) = 1. Let x ∈ X; we say that x violates unanimity in issue k if µ k (x k ) = 0. We say that X is robustly unanimity consistent if, for all µ ∈ ∆ * (X) and all paths γ, F γ (µ) does not violate unanimity in any issue. Note that the interest in a concept such as robust unanimity consistency goes well beyond the sequential interpretation of majority voting, as it rules out any potential conflict between majoritarianism and proposition-wise unanimity.
The following is this section's main result; it is reminiscent of Proposition 1.2 (recall that κ(X) is the size of the largest critical fragment in X).
Theorem 2.2 An aggregation space X ⊆ {0, 1}
K is robustly unanimity consistent if and only if κ(X) ≤ 3.
Proof. To show the necessity of κ(X) ≤ 3, by contraposition, suppose that X admits a critical fragment c of length ≥ 4. By reordering [1...K] if necessary, we can write c = (c 1 , c 2 , ..., c m ) ∈ {0, 1} m with 4 ≤ m ≤ K. By the criticality of c, we can find three elements
Define µ ∈ ∆ * (X) by µ(x j ) = 1/3 for j ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Then µ n (c n ) = 2/3 for n ∈ {1, 2, 3}, while µ n (c n ) = 1 for all n ∈ [4, ..., m], i.e. µ is unanimous in issues 4, ..., m. Now, let γ 7 Recall from Footnote 4 that '¬' stands for the logical negation, i.e. ¬0 = 1 and ¬1 = 0.
8 be the path (1, 2, 3, . . . , K), and consider x := F γ (µ) ∈ X. By the criticality of c, one has x n = c n for all n < m and x m = c m . Thus, x = F γ (µ) violates unanimity in issue m.
For the proof of sufficiency of κ(X) ≤ 3, note first that, if κ(X) ≤ , then a majority on a particular issue can be overridden only as the entailment of − 1 earlier majority decisions. In particular, this can never happen if κ(X) = 2. If κ(X) = 3, it can happen only as the entailment of two earlier majority decisions; but in this case, at least one voter must affirm the entailed decision, so only supermajorities, not unanimities, can be overridden. The formal details of this argument are provided in the appendix. P
Note that the possible violations of respect for unanimity when κ(X) > 3 constructed in the proof of Theorem 2.2 require only three agents and can thus occur quite easily. describes a variant of Arrovian preference aggregation where the voters unanimously agree with the preferences encoded in ¡, and where the social preference order is also required (e.g. by the constitution) to agree with the preferences encoded in ¡. For instance, suppose that all preferences are defined over the Cartesian product M × B where M ⊆ R represents a set of feasible amounts of public expenditure and B is a (finite) set of social states. More concretely, say that b 0 ∈ B stands for the 'status quo' (no public project) and each element in B \ {b 0 } corresponds to a different version of a public project. Moreover, assume that the partial order ¡ expresses monotonicity with respect to the first component in each social state ('more money is better') while refraining from any judgement across states, 
Thus, X pr ¡ is robustly unanimity consistent if and only if width(¡) ≤ 3. Moreover, by equation (5), one obtains a median space in the concrete example if and only if |B| = 2, i.e. if there is only one version of the public project. In that case majority voting with a fixed budget amounts to social choice based on the median willingness to pay for the public project: if total budget is m 0 and the public project costs m 1 ≤ m 0 , then the public project will be realized under majority voting if and only if at least half of the voters prefer (m 0 , b 0 ) to (m 0 − m 1 , b 1 ). Moreover, if |B| = 2, the majority view is always feasible, i.e. is a linear order (that evidently agrees with the preferences encoded in ¡). Robust unanimity consistency, however, also prevails if |B| = 3, i.e. if there are two different versions of the public project.
(c) (Equivalence Relations) Let N ∈ N and consider the spaces X eq N ⊂ {0, 1}
K as in Section 1.5.2. In the Appendix, we show that
Thus, the spaces X eq N are robustly unanimity consistent if and only if N ≤ 3. An example of unanimity violation for N ≥ 4 is the profile considered in Section 1.5.2 above. Suppose again that each of the equivalence relations corresponding to the three partitions {{a, b, c}, {d}}, {{a}, {b, c, d}}, and {{a, b}, {c, d}} receives popular support of 1/3, respectively. Then, if issues are decided by sequential majority voting according to any path that starts with the issues (a, b), (b, c), (c, d), we obtain that all elements of A = {a, b, c, d} are equivalent. But there is unanimous consent that a and d are not equivalent. 
Designable unanimity consistency
Theorem 2.2 above characterizes the aggregation spaces for which respect for a unanimous vote is guaranteed no matter which sequence of majority decisions one chooses. As we have seen, most aggregation spaces cannot guarantee respect for unanimity in this strong sense. In this section, we thus ask whether it is possible to overcome the problem by design. In other words, for a given aggregation space, do there exist paths of majority decisions that guarantee respect for unanimity for all profiles? One might expect a negative answer since prima facie it is not clear how, by design of the sequence, one could 'detect' unanimities in contrast to mere majorities (in a profile-independent way). However, it turns out that sometimes this is indeed possible. Say that an aggregation space X ⊆ {0, 1} K is designably unanimity consistent if there exists a path γ such that, for all µ ∈ ∆ * (X), F γ (µ) does not violate unanimity on any issue. Our first result shows that this weakening of the notion of respect for unanimity does neither help in the case of committee selection nor in the case of resource allocation. Proof of part (a). Evidently, it suffices to show that if there is a unanimity violation for some profile µ along some path γ, then there is a unanimity violation along every path η. Thus, let η be given and consider the permutation
, and note that by the symmetry of the spaces X com I,J;K , η • γ −1 (x) is also feasible. Denote by η • γ −1 (µ) the profile that results from µ by applying the permutation η • γ −1 . Evidently, since µ entails a unanimity violation along γ, η • γ −1 (µ) entails a unanimity violation along the path η. This completes the proof of part (a) of Theorem 3.1.
The proof of part (b) is more involved and is therefore deferred to the Appendix. P Given these negative results for X com I,J;K and X ∆ M,D it is quite remarkable that we have the following positive result for the aggregation of linear preference orders, weak preference orderings, and equivalence relations. The proof of Theorem 3.2 is instructive, so we will sketch the main ideas here. Let X be any of the three spaces in the statement of the theorem, and let [1...N ] be the set of alternatives. A path ζ on the set of all pairs (a, b) ∈ [1...N ] × [1...N ] with a = b such that (a, b) occurs before (a , b ) in ζ whenever min{a, b} < min{a , b } will be called simply ordered.
8 We will show that, for all µ and all simply ordered paths ζ, the transitive relation R ζ (µ) generated by sequential majority voting along ζ respects unanimity in all issues. The relation R * is the so-called 'covering relation', well-known in preference aggregation theory (Miller, 1980) . 9 Note that R * is always transitive, and R * is symmetric whenever R is symmetric. Henceforth, we will refer to the fragment defined by the pair [R * , R * * ] as the covering fragment corresponding to the relation R.
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For any profile µ ∈ ∆ * (X), let [R(µ), R c (µ)] represent the issue-wise majority relation, i.e. aR(µ)b if a majority affirms aRb, and aR c (µ)b if a majority rejects aRb. Moreover, denote by U (µ) the 'unanimity relation' corresponding to µ, i.e. aU (µ)b if under µ there is unanimous agreement that aRb or unanimous agreement that aR c b.
Proof of Lemma 1. This follows from transitivity of R. Suppose that all agents affirm aRb. Then, if a majority affirms bRd, the same majority must affirm aRd by transitivity; similarly, if a majority affirms dRa, the same majority also affirms dRb. This shows the first part of Lemma 1. The second part follows from noting that, if a majority affirms aRd and another majority affirms dRb, then at least one agent must affirm aRd and dRb, hence by transitivity also aRb; thus, we could not have unanimous support for aR c b. P
The following lemma states that the transitive relation that results from sequential majority voting along the path ζ extends the covering fragment corresponding to the issue-wise majority relation.
The proof of Lemma 2 is more involved and is therefore deferred to the Appendix.
Proof of Theorem 3.2. Lemmas 1 and 2 jointly imply that R ζ (µ) extends the 'positive' unanimity relation corresponding to µ, and (R ζ ) c (µ) extends the 'negative' unanimity relation corresponding to µ. The result follows. P
To illustrate the proof of Theorem 3.2, consider again Example 2.1 and Fig. 1 above. As is easily verified, the covering fragment of the majority tournament corresponding to the profile µ is given by {c µ d}. 11 In this example, the covering fragment thus corresponds to the single issue in which there is unanimous consent. If the majority decisions are taken according to the simply ordered path (a, b), (a, c),
, we obtain the ordering c d a b; on the other hand, the path (b, c),
is also simply ordered (given a different ordering of the alternatives) and yields a b c d. Thus, while different admissible paths may give different final outcomes, all resulting orderings must respect unanimous decisions as shown in the proof of Theorem 3.2; indeed, they all extend the covering fragment corresponding to the majority tournament, and the latter does not depend on the decision path.
For the profile µ in Example 2.3(c) above, the covering fragment is given by ( ordered path ζ such that the issue (n, m) occurs before (n , m ) in ζ if min{π(n), π(m)} < min{π(n ), π(m )}, as in the proof of Theorem 3.2. It is easily verified that for the given profile, one obtains the following sets of equivalence classes as the result of sequential majority voting along the path ζ: if π −1 (1) = b, then F ζ (µ) = {{a, b, c}, {d}}; if π −1 (1) = c, then F ζ (µ) = {{a}, {b, c, d}}; and if π −1 (1) ∈ {a, d}, then F ζ (µ) = {{a, b}, {c, d}}. In any of these cases, the unanimous agreement that a ∼ d is respected.
Remark In the case of the aggregation of strict preference orderings, the choice rule among alternatives induced by any path ζ considered in Theorem 3.2 admits the following simple recursive description. First step: let A 1 := [1...N ] be the initial pool of alternatives and set element a 1 := 1 as the initial top alternative.
Step : Compare the current top alternative a −1 to all alternatives m > a −1 in the current pool A −1 . If a −1 wins against all such elements, then a −1 is the final choice; otherwise, let the new top alternative a be the smallest majority winner against a −1 and take A as the old pool minus the majority losers against a −1 . Evidently, this procedure yields a final choice after a finite number of steps, which by Theorem 3.2 cannot be unanimously defeated by another alternative.
For any simply ordered path ζ, the choice rule induced by F ζ (µ) is the same as the one induced by the corresponding multi-stage elimination tree procedure of Shepsle and Weingast (1984) (cf. Section 9.4 in Moulin (1988) ). In contrast to the multi-stage elimination tree which only produces a winning alternative, however, F ζ yields an entire ordering over all alternatives. Moreover, to accomplish this, F ζ only needs
binary comparisons, whereas the multi-stage elimination tree involves (2 N −1 ) − 1 binary comparisons. In particular, in the multi-stage elimination procedure, an alternative may face the same opponent several times; this does not happen along any path ζ.
A necessary condition for designable unanimity consistency
As demonstrated in the proof of Theorem 2.2, any critical fragment of size greater than or equal to 4 can trigger violations of unanimity for some path of issues. Yet, as Theorem 3.2 shows, in certain spaces, for certain specially designed paths only critical fragments of size two or three will be 'activated.' But such spaces appear to be rather exceptional; typically, it will not be possible to 'sidestep' all critical fragments of size greater than three if such fragments exist. In particular, no path can sidestep any exposed critical fragment, as follows.
Recall that C(X) is the set of all critical fragments for X. Let c ∈ C(X), and let J := supp (c). For all j ∈ J, let c j be the fragment obtained by negating the jth coordinate of c. Since c is critical, we know that each c j is contained in some element of X. We will say that c is an exposed critical fragment if there exists a single 'complementary' fragment d ∈ {0, 1} [1...K]\J such that, for all j ∈ supp (c), the element (c j , d) is in X. Let C * (X) be the set of all exposed critical fragments for X. Let κ * (X) be the size of the largest element of C * (X) (with κ * (X) := 0 if C * (X) is empty). (c) (Truth-functional aggregation) Observe that any critical fragment of size K is automatically exposed (with its complementary fragment being the empty word). This observation yields exposed critical fragments for judgement aggregation problems associated with several common truth functions. For example, let
where "&" denotes logical conjunction. Then the sequence (1, 1, . . . , 1, 0) is an exposed critical fragment. Next, let X ∨ := {x ∈ {0, 1}
K ; x K = x 1 ∨x 2 ∨· · ·∨x K−1 }, where "∨" denotes logical disjunction. Then the sequence (0, 0, . . . , 0, 1) is an exposed critical fragment. Finally, let ⊕ denote the "exclusive OR" operation, and let
, then the sequence (1, 1, . . . , 1, 1) is an exposed critical fragment. If K is odd, then the sequence (1, 1, . . . , 1, 0) is an exposed critical fragment. ♦ Theorem 3.4 If κ * (X) ≥ 4, then the aggregation space X is not designably unanimity consistent.
When combined with Example 3.3(b), Theorem 3.4 implies that, for any N ≥ 4, the space of acyclic relations on N is not designably unanimity consistent. Likewise, Example 3.3(c) shows that several common truth-function aggregation problems are not designably unanimity consistent.
Clearly, the positive examples in Theorem 3.2 above verify the necessary condition κ * (X) ≤ 3 of Theorem 3.4. However, this does not mean that all spaces with κ * (X) ≤ 3 share the simple structure of the spaces displayed in Theorem 3.2. The following example of all separable preference orderings shows that there are spaces of transitive relations with κ * (X) ≤ 3 in which unanimity violations do occur along simply ordered paths.
Example 3.5 Consider the space X sep of all separable preference orderings on the set A = {0, 1} 3 . A preference ordering on {0, 1} 3 is called separable if, for all a, b ∈ {0, 1} 3 and all j ∈ {1, 2, 3},
In the Appendix, we verify that κ * (X sep ) = 3. 12 Nevertheless, unanimity violations do occur along simply ordered paths. For instance, suppose that one third of the population has the alternative m 1 := (0, 1, 1) on top of their preference ordering, another third of the population the alternative m 2 = (1, 0, 1), and the final third of the population the alternative m 3 := (1, 1, 0), while all individuals agree that (0, 0, 0)
(1, 1, 1). Such profile is compatible with separability.
13 Consider any simply ordered path that first compares the alternative (1, 1, 1) with its three neighbors m 1 , m 2 , m 3 . In each case, (1, 1, 1) receives majority support of 2/3. For instance, if (1, 0, 1) is the top alternative, then (1, 0, 1) is preferred to (0, 0, 1), hence by separability, (1, 1, 1) is preferred to m 1 ; similarly, if (1, 1, 0 ) is the top alternative, then (1, 1, 0) is preferred to (0, 1, 0), hence again by separability, (1, 1, 1 ) is preferred to m 1 . This shows that (1, 1, 1) gets majority support over m 1 . By an analogous argument, (1, 1, 1) also receives majority support over m 2 and over m 3 . But if (1, 1, 1) m j for all j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, then separability and transitivity imply (1, 1, 1) (0, 0, 0), in violation of unanimity.
♦ Does the fact that Lemma 2 fails on the subspace of all separable preference orderings mean that this space is not designably unanimity consistent? After all, there could be other, non simply-ordered paths along which unanimity violations never occur. Can the argument given in Theorem 3.2 be generalized to demonstrate designable unanimity consistency of a larger class of spaces? We conclude this section with two conjectures that -without answering these questions -are meant to shed light on the issue. To formulate them, we need some additional concepts.
Recall that a critical fragment of X is a minimal forbidden binary sequence. Equivalently, a critical fragment of X is a maximal fragment of {0,
, and no proper subfragment of w has this property. A collection B ⊆ C(X) of critical fragments is called a critical basis for X if, for all x ∈ {0, 1} K \ X, there exists w ∈ B such that w x, while this fails for any proper subfamily of B.
To illustrate, consider again the space of all strict preference orderings X pr N . Each critical fragment of the form 1 (a,b) , 1 (b,c) , 0 (a,c) corresponds to the transitivity requirement (a b & b c) ⇒ a c, and in fact, all critical fragments of length 3 have this form. While there are also critical fragments of length greater than 3, the family of all critical fragments of the form 1 (a,b) , 1 (b,c) , 0 (a,c) form a critical basis of X pr N . To see this, consider, say, the critical fragment v = 1 (a,b) , 1 (b,c) , 1 (c,d) , 0 (a,d) . Evidently, v corresponds to a 4-cycle, hence to an indirect implication of transitivity. Take any x ∈ {0, 1} K with v x; since v is a critical fragment, we have x ∈ X. To verify that the critical fragments of length 3 form a critical basis, we have to show that there exists a critical fragment w of length 3 such that w x. Indeed, if x (a,c) = 0, then x contains the critical fragment 1 (a,b) , 1 (b,c) , 0 (a,c) , and if x (a,c) = 1, then x contains the critical fragment 1 (a,c) , 1 (c,d) , 0 (a,d) . This argument can be straightforwardly extended to cycles of any length. Obviously, every paired simple space is a simple space. The converse does not hold as Example 3.5 shows. Examples of paired simple spaces of transitive relations are the set of all weak partial orderings (corresponding to D = ∅), the set of all strict partial orderings (corresponding to the case in which D consists of all asymmetry requirements of the form aRb ⇒ bR c a), the set of all weak orderings (when D consists of all completeness requirements of the form aR c b ⇒ bRa), the set of all strict preference orderings (when D consists of all asymmetry and completeness requirements), and the set of all equivalence relations (when D consists of all symmetry requirements of the form aRb ⇒ bRa).
Conjecture 1 All paired simple spaces of transitive relations are designably unanimity consistent.
Conjecture 2 All simple spaces of transitive relations are designably unanimity consistent.
The envisaged proof strategy of Conjecture 1 is to adapt our proof of Theorem 3.2, showing via Lemma 2 that unanimity violations cannot occur along simply ordered paths. However, our present proof of Lemma 2 (provided in the appendix) is not ready-made for this purpose since in general paired simple spaces the structure of critical fragments is more complex than in the three exemplary spaces considered in Theorem 3.2.
As Example 3.5 shows, the stronger Conjecture 2 -if correct -requires a different argument; in particular, one would first have to find an appropriate class of paths along which unanimity violations cannot occur. The statement of Conjecture 2 seems to be considerably less likely to be true.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have provided a simple characterization of the class of aggregation spaces in which sequential majority voting guarantees respect for unanimity, no matter in which sequence the (majority) decisions are taken ('robust unanimity consistency').
We have also investigated the weaker condition that there exists a decision path along which unanimous judgements are always respected ('designable unanimity consistency'), and provided positive as well as negative examples. The positive examples that we found are all placed in spaces of transitive binary relations with a particularly simple structure. Finally, we offered two conjectures about the scope of designable unanimity consistency; it seems to be a worthwhile problem for future research to settle these conjectures and to clarify whether there exist further interesting and relevant positive examples.
Appendix: Proofs
Notation A.1. Let J ⊂ [1...K], and let w ∈ {0, 1} J . We define [w] := {x ∈ {0, 1} K ; w x}. Thus, w is X-forbidden if and only if X ∩ [w] = ∅. It is sometimes convenient to express w as an element of {0, 1, * } K , where we define w k = * for all k ∈ J. For example, suppose J = {i, i + 1, . . . , j} for some i ≤ j ≤ K; then we would write w = ( * , . . . ,
Proof of Theorem 2.2. Let µ ∈ ∆ * (X), and let Unan(µ) := {x ∈ {0, 1} K ; x does not violate µ-unanimity}.
Necessity of κ(X) ≤ 3 for robust unanimity consistency has already been shown in the main text. In order to demonstrate sufficiency, suppose that all critical fragments have order 3 or less. If Maj(µ) ∈ X, then Cond (X, µ) = {Maj(µ)} and we're done, because Maj(µ) ∈ Unan(µ).
Suppose Maj(µ) ∈ X, and let y ∈ Cond (X, µ).
such that y i = c i and y j = c j , thereby forcing y k = c k .
(If there was no such critical fragment, then we could change y k to Maj k (µ) without leaving X -hence y ∈ Cond (X, µ)).
, and of course,
By contradiction, we must have
The contrapositive of Claim 1 says that y k = Maj k (µ) whenever µ k (Maj k (µ)) = 1; thus, y ∈ Unan(µ). This holds for all y ∈ Cond (X, µ); hence Cond (X, µ) ⊆ Unan(µ), as desired. P
Proof of Example 2.3(a).
(This is a special case of the proof of Example 2.3(b) below). 1 (creating a transitivity violation), for some a 1 , . . . , a M ∈ [1...N ] ; such a cycle can have at most N elements. Furthermore, this X pr N -forbidden fragment is critical if it only specifies the ordering between nearest neighbours in the preference cycle (otherwise it has redundant coordinates which can be removed to obtain a forbidden subfragment). Thus a X Now, |B| = V , and Claim 1 implies that V = |v|, while |v| > W by hypothesis. Thus, |B| > W , so B cannot be a ¡-antichain. Thus, there exist some n, m ∈ [1...V ] such that b n ¡ b m . Clearly, n ≡ m ± 1 (mod V ), because (n, n + 1) and (n, n − 1) are represented by elements of [1...J] (because they form part of the support of v). If n < m, then we can remove the elements {b n+1 , . . . , b m−1 } and get a shorter cycle:
If n > m, then we can remove the elements {b 1 , . . . , b m−1 } and {b n+1 , . . . , b V } and get a shorter cycle:
Either way, we can construct a smaller (X By construction, we must have . By construction, one has aI ζ (µ)1 ⇔ aI(µ)1, i.e. aI ζ (µ)1 ⇔ a ∈ E 1 . By transitivity, one therefore has aI ζ (µ)b for all a, b ∈ E 1 and not (cI ζ (µ)d) for all c ∈ E 1 and all d ∈ N 1 , i.e. E 1 is the R ζ (µ)-equivalence class to which 1 belongs. Note that at this moment, R ζ (µ) is determined exactly for those issues (a, b) for which a ∈ E 1 or b ∈ E 1 .
Claim 1:
The relation R ζ (µ) as determined so far respects the covering fragment, that is: for all issues (a, b) such that a ∈ E 1 or b ∈ E 1 , aR
• We conclude that all critical fragments of length 3 are exposed critical fragments for X Suppose κ * (X) > 4; we will show that X is not designably unanimity consistent. Let c ∈ C * (X) be an exposed critical fragment with |c| ≥ 4. The word c is forbidden. Thus, Claim 1 implies that F ζ (µ) j * = c j * . But by construction, µ[c j * ] = 1. Thus, F ζ must violate unanimity in coordinate j * .
We can construct such a profile µ for any path ζ. Thus, F is not designably unanimity consistent. P Remark. The proof of Theorem 3.4 seems very similar to the proof of Theorem 2.2, but there is a subtle difference. In the proof of Theorem 2.2, we could specify a path which moved through all elements of [1 . . . J+1] before moving on to any elements of [J+2 . . . K]. Thus, it was easy to construct a profile which forced this path to violate unanimity. But in the proof of Theorem 3.4 we don't have this freedom; the proof must work for any path. This is why c must be an exposed critical fragment.
Proof of Example 3.5. We show that all exposed critical fragments of X sep have length equal to 3. Let c be a critical fragment of X sep . First, suppose that |c| = 2; then, c = (c 1 , c 2 ) corresponds to a separability restriction of the form [(a j , a −j ) (b j , a −j )] ⇔ [(a j , b −j ) (b j , b −j )] for some a, b ∈ {0, 1} 3 and some j ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Say, c 1 corresponds to the affirmation of '(a j , a −j ) (b j , a −j )' while c 2 corresponds to the negation of '(a j , b −j ) (b j , b −j ).' Consider any f −j different from both a −j and b −j (such an f exists because a, b ∈ {0, 1}
3 ), and the issue (a j , f −j ) (b j , f −j ). Any complementary fragment d ∈ {0, 1} K−2 must either affirm or negate the proposition '(a j , f −j ) (b j , f −j ),' hence one cannot have both (c 1 , ¬c 2 , d) ∈ X sep and (¬c 1 , c 2 , d) ∈ X sep . Thus, c is not exposed.
Next, suppose |c| > 2, and suppose that c is exposed. 
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